Naming and necessity pdf
Naming and Necessity - WikipediaI would suggest you read all of Lecture I for this meeting, but we will focus on pp. You do not need to read the Preface, which considers some objections that were made after the lectures were originally published. Hale and C. Wright, eds. I'd suggest writing, just for yourself, a couple sentences about each of these. We will focus on the first two for this meeting. On pp.
Naming and Necessity
Semantics of Natural Language pp Cite as. I hope that some people see some connection between the two topics in the title. If not, anyway, such connections will be developed in the course of these talks. Materialism, in this form, often now gets involved in very intricate ways in questions about what is necessary or contingent in identity of properties — questions like that. So, it is really very important to philosophers who may want to work in many domains to get clear about these concepts.
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below! The whole theory depended on always being able to specify unique conditions which are satisfied. But still we can look at the other theses. The picture associated with the theory is that only by giving some unique properties can you know who someone is and thus know what the reference of your name is.
Naming and Necessity is a book with the transcript of three lectures, given by the philosopher Saul Kripke , at Princeton University in , in which he dealt with the debates of proper names in the philosophy of language. Language is a primary concern of analytic philosophers , particularly the use of language to express concepts and to refer to individuals. In Naming and Necessity , Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy:. Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on descriptivist theories of proper names. According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous with descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the name's being associated with a description or cluster of descriptions that an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke rejects both these kinds of descriptivism.